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2 formulations of TAG are unsound or otherwise problematic. Nevertheless, it wouldn't follow that no formulation of TAG is (or could be) successful.
To be fair to Reiter, his characterization of TAG seems to recognize this point:
The gist or "theme" of this argument is that the existence of the Christian God is in some way a metaphysically necessary precondition for one or more of the most basic features of human life and experience. 3 In my view, this is a perfectly respectable description of TAG as a family of arguments or as a project in theistic argumentation. After giving this summary, Reiter immediately laments the absence of a "clear and detailed statement of exactly what the argument is." While this might suggest he thinks there ought to be an official version of the argument lurking out there somewhere, perhaps his point is merely that there is no clear and detailed statement of any version of TAG in the literature, even granting that TAG can be formulated in different ways. In any event, my purpose in making this preliminary observation is not to criticize Reiter (with whose lament I sympathize) but to caution against interpreting the dilemma he poses as problem for TAG in principle. At worst it is a problem for certain formulations of TAG (formulations which admittedly have some basis in the literature). 4 I turn now to the details of Reiter's dilemma for proponents of TAG. He begins by identifying three theistic argument patterns, where p stands for some unspecified proposition and G stands for the proposition God exists:
(1) p.
(2) If p, then G.
So (3) G.
3 Reiter, "A Dilemma for the Proponent of the Transcendental Argument for God's Existence," 465. 4 Reiter's dilemma would appear to apply, for example, to Don Collett's formalization of the transcendental (1) p.
(2) Necessarily, if p, then G.
Pattern III:
(1) Necessarily, p.
Reiter notes that while all three patterns are logically valid, only pattern-III arguments yield the conclusion that God exists necessarily (i.e., God exists not merely in the actual world but in every possible world). He further notes that according to an article by Sean Choi, TAG is best understood as a pattern-II argument.
5 Whether Choi is correct on this point can be debated, as we'll see, but let us grant it for now.
Having identified these three argument patterns, Reiter introduces his dilemma by asking the following question (which I paraphrase): Does TAG purport to prove that God necessarily exists or merely that God actually exists? Based on remarks by presuppositionalists Greg
Bahnsen and Don Collett, Reiter suggests that proponents of TAG apparently wish to secure the stronger conclusion that God necessarily exists. His contention, however, is that TAG (construed as a pattern-II argument) faces an objection either way.
On the one hand, if TAG purports to prove only that God actually exists then TAG is superfluous, because a pattern-I argument could establish the very same conclusion. There would be no need for a distinctive transcendental argument after all (assuming that TAG is a pattern-II argument fortified with ACG): on the one hand, if the desired conclusion is the actuality of God's existence then TAG is superfluous, because a pattern-I argument fortified with ACG is sufficient for this; 8 on the other hand, if the desired conclusion is the necessity of God's existence then TAG is still superfluous, because a pattern-I argument fortified with ACG is also sufficient for this. Either way, TAG is superfluous if it has to appeal to ACG.
I will now suggest three lines of response that the proponent of TAG could offer in reply.
The first is simply to reject the initial claim that TAG ought to be construed as a pattern-II argument. As noted above, Reiter derives this claim from Sean Choi, who in turn appeals to
Robert Stern in support of the idea that the transcendental premise of a transcendental argument must express a metaphysically necessary condition (i.e., "Necessarily, if X, then Y,"
where X is some essential feature of human thought or experience). 9 Stern's authority in this area is formidable. Still, there does not seem to be a consensus on this particular point in the literature on transcendental arguments. 10 If there is any consensus on the nature of the transcendental premise, it is that the premise must at least express a necessary condition of some essential feature of human thought or experience (i.e., "If X, then Y").
It therefore seems open to the TAG proponent to argue that a pattern-I argument could qualify as a genuine transcendental argument. 8 In fact, a pattern-I argument without ACG would be sufficient, as per the original dilemma. (1) We conceive of material objects.
(2) Necessarily, we conceive of material objects only if material objects exist.
14 (3) Therefore, material objects exist.
Irrespective of whether the argument is a good one, most philosophers would grant that its conclusion cannot be logically necessary, for it seems evident that there are possible worlds in which no material objects exist. Nevertheless, if this transcendental argument were sound, its conclusion would exhibit a transcendental necessity: material objects exist not only in the actual world but also in every possible world in which there are human minds that conceive of material objects.
If this notion of transcendental necessity is coherent and non-trivial, as it appears to be, it is
open for the proponent of TAG to claim that it shows God's existence to be transcendentally necessary: God must exist in every possible world in which there is human thought or experience. 15 Furthermore, if this is indeed the kind of necessity the TAG proponent has in mind, then TAG isn't vulnerable to Reiter's dilemma. For while a pattern-II argument would might worry that these definitions are too broad, since it would follow that necessarily existent abstract objects (e.g., numbers, propositions, and universals, on a realist view) are transcendentally necessary. But this needn't be a concern if such objects turn out to be ontologically dependent on God (as argued by advocates of theistic activism and theistic conceptual realism). Another solution would be to add a relevance clause to our definitions, e.g., a state of affairs S is transcendentally necessary just in case (i) S obtains in the actual world and every other possible world in which there is human thought or experience and (ii) S's obtaining is a metaphysical precondition 16 It should be noted that transcendental necessity is entirely compatible with broad logical necessity; in fact, it's easy to see that broad logical necessity entails transcendental necessity. So even if the proponent of TAG claims only that the argument proves the transcendental necessity of God's existence, he isn't thereby denying the broad logical necessity of God's existence. Indeed, if he holds to ACG he will be committed to both.
No intelligent predication is possible except on the basis of the truth, that is the absolute truth of Christianity. 18 It is the firm conviction of every epistemologically self-conscious Christian that no human being can utter a single syllable, whether in negation or affirmation, unless it were for God's existence.
Thus the transcendental argument seeks to discover what sort of foundations the house of human knowledge must have, in order to be what it is. 19 The whole contention of the Christian theistic position is that what is called the subject-object relation, that is, the possibility of my having knowledge of any object whatsoever, is unintelligible except upon the presupposition that every subject of knowledge, since subjects are from this point of view also objects, owes its existence and its connotation, in the last analysis, to God. 20 The better theologians of the church … have sensed something of the fact that all the theistic arguments should really be taken together and reduced to the one argument of the possibility of human predication. Intelligent predication about anything with respect to nature or with respect to man were impossible unless God existed as the ultimate reference point of it all. 21 We argue, therefore, by "presupposition." The Christian, as did Tertullian, must contest the very principles of his opponent's position. The only "proof" of the Christian position is that unless its truth is presupposed there is no possibility of "proving" anything at all. The actual state of affairs as preached by Christianity is the necessary foundation of "proof" itself.
22
I have drawn attention to the fact that when Van Til characterizes the relationship between God and human thought, he often makes distinctively modal claims. 23 Van Til held not merely that God's existence is a necessary condition of human thought (knowledge, predication, argumentation, etc.) but that his existence is a necessary condition of the possibility of such thought. Even had there been no human thought in actuality, God would still have had to exist, for his existence is a necessary condition of the mere possibility of human thought. 24 If this is indeed how Van Til conceived of the transcendental necessity of God's existence, we can be even more specific concerning the formulation of TAG, for the unspecified proposition p can now be replaced with the specific proposition that human thought is possible.
A pattern-II formulation of TAG could therefore be expanded as follows (where T stands for the proposition that there is human thought):
(1) Possibly, T.
(2) Necessarily, if possibly, T, then G.
So (3) G.
Clearly this argument is deductively valid and delivers the conclusion that God exists. However, under the modal system S5, which is widely (though not universally) accepted by philosophers, an even stronger conclusion can be derived from the same premises, as follows:
In other words, if the transcendental premise is understood as a claim about a necessary condition of the possibility of human thought, then TAG delivers the conclusion that God's existence is not only transcendentally necessary (in the sense discussed earlier) but necessary in the broad logical sense as well. 25 Furthermore, this interpretation of the transcendental premise of TAG would explain why a pattern-II argument is required after all. A pattern-I argument, which lacks the necessity operator in the conditional premise, would not deliver the same conclusion even if its first premise expressed a possibility claim; it would only deliver the conclusion that God actually exists.
We can therefore see that a transcendental argument for God constructed along these lines neatly evades Reiter's dilemma, for it is a pattern-II argument that is adequate but not superfluous: it delivers the desired conclusion-the necessity of God's existence-where a pattern-I argument with the same initial premise would not. Moreover, TAG understood in this way has no need to appeal to the Anselmian conception of God to bridge the gap between the actuality of God's existence and the necessity of God's existence. . 26 Reiter might object that this third response does not in fact evade his dilemma because it involves a covert shift from a pattern-II argument to a pattern-III argument (a move he tentatively recommends at the conclusion of his article). It is not obvious, however, that this formulation of TAG adopts pattern III rather than pattern II; after all, its initial premise is not itself a necessity claim. But even if the objection were conceded, there's no obvious reason why TAG couldn't be reconceived as a pattern-III argument.
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12 I have argued that Reiter's dilemma should not be construed as a problem for TAG in principle and that at least three lines of response are available to the proponent of TAG. While the first of these has some clear disadvantages, it is not wholly without merit. The second and third responses, however, have the following virtues: they grant Reiter's characterization of the structure of TAG, they preserve presuppositionalist claims about the distinctiveness of TAG as a transcendental argument, and they are not ad hoc insofar as they have a basis in the writings of leading presuppositionalists. This is not to suggest, of course, that the TAG proponent doesn't face other formidable challenges in formulating and defending his argument, such as the task of defending the crucial transcendental premise. 27 But sufficient unto the day is the challenge thereof. Although Reiter's dilemma does not pose a significant difficulty for the proponent of TAG, presuppositionalists should be very grateful for his analytical prodding. It is regrettable that such prodding has proven necessary, but I trust that this response advances the discussion. 
